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In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we 
ourselves believe or desire. This has been labeled ‗egocentric bias.‘ Egocentric bias seems to 
be particularly true of young children. For many years, it has indeed been asserted that 
children under four years of age cannot adopt someone else‘s perspective, as shown by their 
failure to pass the false-belief task. Instead, they judge that the others share their true belief. 
But children are not the only victims of egocentric bias. Even adults, who are supposed to 
have achieved sophisticated mindreading abilities, can neglect differences between their own 
perspective and other people‘s perspective. Experts are particularly likely to suffer from a 
form of this problem known as the curse of knowledge: for example, business experts can fail 
to discount their own knowledge when predicting corporate earning forecasts by less-
informed people (Camerer et al., 1989). Egocentric bias has been taken as evidence that our 
own perspective has some kind of priority: (i) developmental priority: we learn first what we 
believe, and only later can we judge what others believe; (ii) computational priority: it is less 
cognitively demanding to judge what we believe than what others believe; (iii) epistemic 
priority: we have a privileged access to our own beliefs that we do not have for other people‘s 
beliefs.  
One of the assets of the Simulation theory, as defended by Alvin Goldman in many papers 
and in his recent book Simulating minds, is its ability to explain egocentric bias, and more 
generally the priority of first-person mindreading (self-ascription of mental states) over third-
person mindreading (ascription of mental states to other people). In particular, Goldman 
accounts for egocentric bias in terms of failure to quarantine one‘s own perspective. When 
one tries to understand other people, one puts oneself in their shoes. To do so, one pretends to 
be in the same situation and to have their beliefs and desires. This involves inhibiting one‘s 
own beliefs and desires. But one can neglect or fail to do so. This results in egocentric errors.  
This is not to say that we systematically fail to understand other people and forget that they 
can have a different perspective. If it were the case, then it would be highly difficult, if not 
impossible, to communicate, cooperate or compete with them. In those situations, we need to 
take the other person‘s perspective and to inhibit our own. But can the other‘s perspective 
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furtively intrude even when no reason seems to require it, or even when it is detrimental for 
us? We shall see a series of evidence of what has been called altercentric bias (Samson et al., 
2010; Apperly, 2011): other people‘s beliefs can unduly influence us even when they are 
wrong. At first sight, altercentric bias questions 1
st
 person priority. In particular, it may appear 
as incompatible with simulation-based accounts of 3
rd
 person mindreading. We shall argue, on 
the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that 
go both ways: taking one‘s beliefs for the other‘s beliefs (egocentric bias) and vice-versa, 
taking the other‘s beliefs for one‘s beliefs (altercentric bias). We shall then see how the risk of 
such confusion may be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, questioning thus 
the evolutionary plausibility of the simulation theory.    
 
1. When the self takes over 
For many years, the debate in the mindreading literature was framed in either/or terms: 
either 3
rd
 person mindreading results from theorizing or from simulating. Goldman 
convincingly argued in favor of the latter. By putting ourselves in the others‘ shoes and 
running off-line our own cognitive resources, we can simulate or re-create other people‘s 
mental states. Since then, several hybrid views have been proposed. As well argued by 
Goldman (2006), simulation and theorizing need not be in competition. Rather, they may 
cooperate (if for instance, a theory is used to select the pretend inputs). Furthermore, some 
instantiations of mindreading may result from simulation only, whereas others may result 
from theorizing only. Nonetheless, even in its hybrid versions, at least one disagreement 
remains. In a nutshell, the priority of 1
st
 person mindreading over 3
rd
 person mindreading is at 
the core of Goldman‘s view, whereas most Theory theories and Rationality theories do not 
posit any asymmetry between 1
st
 person and 3
rd
 person mindreading (see for instance, 
Gopnik, 1993).  




 person mindreading, one can ask two 
questions: (i) do they rely on the same psychological mechanisms or processes? (ii) if they 
rely on different mechanisms, are they fully independent or does one require the other? The 
debate is best illuminated if we compare Alvin Goldman and Peter Carruthers, who sit at two 
opposite sides of the debate. According to Goldman (1993a, 1993b, 2006), different processes 
are at stake in 1
st
 person and 3
rd
 person mindreading, with the latter depending on the former. 
Self-knowledge relies on a kind of inner sense or introspection, which utilizes an innate code 
in the language of thought, whose basic elements are caused by the various mental state types. 
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On the other hand, 3
rd
 person mindreading consists in taking another person‘s perspective and 
in operating offline on the initial pretend states to generate further states, which can then be 
ascribed to the other person. Consequently, one needs to access one‘s own pretend states to be 
able to understand other people. There is a primacy of 1
st









 mindreading do not 
result from different mechanisms as far as propositional attitudes are concerned. Rather, they 
both involve interpretation. In particular, 1
st
 person mindreading consists in swift unconscious 
self-interpretation. Hence, there is just a single faculty involved in both types of mindreading, 
using essentially the same type of inputs. There is no priority of self-knowledge of 
propositional attitudes.  
Now a common complaint from the psychology side of the mindreading literature has been 
that one cannot empirically settle the debate between Simulation theory and its rivals (see for 
example Apperly, 2011). However, one may suggest that the analysis of mindreading biases 
offers a promising way to test the various theories, including the hypothesis of the 
(a)symmetry of 1
st
 person and 3
rd
 person mindreading. More particularly, according to 
Goldman (2006) and Goldman and Sebanz (2005), only the simulation theory can account for 
egocentric bias. 
The clearest example of egocentric bias can be found in young children. In the classic 
version of the false-belief task, children observe the puppet Maxi putting a chocolate bar in 
the kitchen cupboard and leaving the room. Meanwhile Maxi‘s mother comes in the kitchen 
and puts the chocolate bar in the fridge. Then Maxi comes back. Children are asked where 
Maxi will search his chocolate bar when he comes back: in the cupboard or in the fridge. It 
has been repeatedly found that children under four years of age typically answer that Maxi 
will search in the fridge. They assume that Maxi has the same belief they have. In other 
words, they are victims of egocentric bias. But children are not the only ones to be sensitive to 
such bias. For example, Keysar and colleagues (2003) asked adult participants first to hide an 
object in a bag, unbeknown to the experimenter. Then the experimenter gave them rough 
descriptions of objects, which they were asked to move around in a grid. The description 
could sometimes better characterize the hidden object in the bag than a visible object in the 
grid. Yet, the correct response was to move the visible object, thus taking into account the 
experimenter‘s ignorance of the object in the bag. However, it was found that the participants 
                                                        
1 However, simulation theories are not necessarily committed to first-person priority. For example, Gordon 
(1996), one of the earliest proponents of the Simulation theory, wonders about the legitimacy of the inference 
―from me to you‖ that is required by the simulation process as described by Goldman. 
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frequently took the object in the bag. There are many other examples of egocentric errors both 
in experimental conditions and in everyday life (for review, see Goldman, 2006, ch. 7 and 
Apperly, 2011, ch. 5). No matter how old we are, we can sometimes forget that other people 
do not share our beliefs and desires. 
Egocentric errors have been taken as evidence of the priority of 1
st
 person mindreading 
over 3
rd
 person mindreading, which seems in line with the Simulation theory. When taking 
another‘s perspective, the subject can never fully pretend to be the other, that is, to have all 
the other‘s mental states. Rather, the offline use of psychological processes takes as inputs 
some pretend states but also some of the subject‘s own mental states (Nichols and Stich, 
2003). This is not a problem if the other shares the subject‘s mental states, if they correspond 
to some commonsense assumptions for example. But this can lead to mindreading errors if the 
other has different beliefs or desires, as in the false-belief task. It is then especially important 
for the subject to quarantine her own mental states. Failure to do so leads to egocentric errors.  
While one can easily account for egocentric errors within the simulationist framework, it 
seems more difficult to do so within the framework of the Theory theory and the Rationality 
theory, the two other main rivals to Goldman‘s view. If indeed 3rd person mindreading does 
not recruit 1
st
 person mindreading, it is hard to see how the subject‘s own mental states could 
interfere with the understanding of other people. One possible answer could be that the folk 
psychology used by mindreaders includes a ‗like-me‘ rule among other psychological laws. 
On this rule, the subject assumes that other people‘s mental states are like her own mental 
states. This may be plausible in children, although we shall see that even young infants do not 
always apply this rule. But Goldman argues that it is less intuitive in adults, and yet, they are 
also victims of egocentric errors even in simple situations in which one might expect them to 
make no error like in Keysar and colleagues.  
One may not be as confident as Goldman that egocentric errors can be used as an argument 
in favor of the Simulation theory. On the one hand, some results interpreted in terms of 
egocentric mindreading errors may just reflect the lack of 3
rd
 person mindreading. For 
example, one may suggest that in Keysar and coll. (2003), participants do not try to 
understand the experimenter‘s communicative intention about which object she has in mind; 
rather, they merely match a physical description to the object that fits best. As concluded by 
the authors themselves, ―Under these circumstances, directly computing what another person 
knows or does not know at a given moment might be more trouble than it is worth‖ (Keysar et 
al., 2003, p. 39). If this interpretation is correct, these specific results are not relevant for 3
rd
 
F. de Vignemont & H. Mercier (draft). Under influence. In Alvin Goldman and his Critics, edited by Hilary 
Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, Blackwell. 
person mindreading because the participants do not use a mindreading strategy. In addition, 
even for egocentric errors that result from mindreading errors and cannot be reduced in such a 
way, it is not clear that the Simulation theory only can explain them. For example, Wallin 
(2011) interprets them within the framework of the Rationality theory. It is sometimes rational 
to attribute one‘s own mental states to other people. On this view, egocentric errors are 
merely a collateral damage of an efficient heuristic. Hence, it seems that one cannot use 
egocentric errors to settle the debate between the Simulation theory and its rivals. The 
Simulation theory, however, has to face a more important problem than the fact that other 
theories can account for egocentric errors. Indeed recent results seem to question the priority 
of first-person mindreading. As we shall see now, we can also make altercentric mindreading 
errors. But can the Simulation theory account for them?  
 
2. When the other takes over 
The landscape of the experimental study of mindreading has greatly changed these last few 
years. In particular, new versions of the classic false-belief task have appeared, showing that 
egocentric bias might be present only in explicit verbal behavior, but not in more implicit 
behavioral cues (for review, see Baillargeon et al., 2010). In new versions of the false-beliefs 
task, children are not asked any question about the puppet. Rather, the experimenter analyzes 
where the children look, that is, where they visually anticipate Maxi to search for the candy 
bar. It was found that infants in the second year of life rightly looked toward the cupboard. 
Alternatively, the experimenter tests whether children look longer when Maxi acts in a 
manner that is inconsistent with his false belief. Again, it was found that young infants look 
longer when Maxi looks for the chocolate bar in the fridge. Young infants may be less 
egocentric than expected. As we shall see now, the same may be true of adults as well.  
How do you describe spatial relations between objects? The book is on the right of the 
bottle, will you spontaneously say, and this is so from your own perspective. However, a 
recent study showed that one could spontaneously switch to another individual‘s perspective, 
even when the situation did not require it (Tversky and Hard, 2009). When participants saw a 
photograph of a bottle and a book on a table, with a man seated behind the table, about a 
quarter of them described the spatial relations from the man‘s perspective (e.g., the book is on 
the left of the bottle in a framework centered on the man), although they had no interaction 
with the man depicted in the photograph. Along the same line, it was found that participants 
used different strategies to judge hand laterality when two participants facing each other 
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simultaneously performed the task and when only one was doing the task while the other 
closed her eyes (Böckler et al., 2011). The analysis of the reaction time relative to the angle of 
rotation showed that when alone, the participant used motor imagery to mentally rotate her 
own hand to match the displayed hand (egocentric frame). By contrast, in joint situation, the 
two participants mentally mapped the displayed hand onto body axes (allocentric frame). Yet, 
the fact that another individual was performing the same task at the same time had no 
relevance for the task itself. The participants themselves were not aware that the other‘s 
presence had affected their performance. Thus, the presence of other people, with whom one 
does not interact in any way and which should be normally irrelevant here, can lead to a 
switch of spatial reference frame.  
Not only can we spontaneously take another person‘s visuo-spatial perspective, but we can 
also lose our own perspective in the process. This is so even when the other has a false belief, 
while we have a true belief, as illustrated by the following study. In Kovacs and coll. (2010), 
participants see a video showing a small story with a smurf, a ball and a screen. The story 
varies (e.g., the ball stays or not where the smurf has put it in the smurf‘s presence or absence; 
the ball reappears ‗magically‘ at the end or not behind the screen, etc.). In one condition, the 
smurf comes back at the end and the screen is removed showing the ball. Participants are then 
asked to press a button as soon as they detect the ball. It was found that if the participants 
believed that there was a ball behind the screen, they replied more quickly than if they did not 
believe that there was a ball. Interestingly, participants were as quick to detect the ball (i) 
when they expected the ball and (ii) when the smurf expected the ball, although the 
participants themselves did not expect it.
2
 Participants therefore took into account the smurf‘s 
belief, although it was in contradiction with their own true belief and it was not required by 
the task. Finally, participants replied more quickly even if the smurf was absent when the 
screen was removed.  
A further study showed that another‘s beliefs could influence our judgment even when 
explicitly required to focus on our own perspective (Samson et al., 2010). Participants saw on 
a screen a room with an avatar and red discs displayed on one or two walls. In one condition, 
the avatar could see all the discs in the room. In another condition, the avatar could see only 
some of them (e.g., she turned her back to a wall with discs). Participants were then asked 
                                                        
2 In this key condition, participants see the smurf hiding a ball behind a screen, the ball rolling out of the screen 
and the smurf leaving the room. They then see the ball going back behind the screen in the smurf‘s absence. 
Thus, the smurf falsely believes that the ball is still behind the screen and the participants rightly believe that 
there is no ball. 
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how many discs there were either from their own perspective or from the avatar‘s perspective. 
Interestingly, even when participants were explicitly asked to judge based on their own 
perspective, their answer was affected by the avatar‘s perspective. More precisely, they took 
significantly more time to respond and they made more errors.  
In all these studies, another individual‘s perspective (or belief) affected the participants one 
way or the other, although it did not seem to be directly relevant for the task. One may draw 
two conclusions on the basis of these results, what we call the Automaticity claim and the 
Altercentricity claim. On the one hand, these results indicate that we mindread other people 
even when nothing seems to require it. One may then take these results as evidence in favor of 
the automaticity of some components of mindreading (Kovacs et al., 2010; Samson et al., 
2010; Apperly, 2011). According to the Automaticity claim, we cannot help but mindreading 
people around us. 3
rd
 On the other hand, these results indicate that another‘s perspective 
seems to dominate our own perspective in some circumstances. The output of third-person 
mindreading to some extent can unduly influence our mental processes and behavior. 
According to the Altercentricity claim, the other‘s perspective can intrude in our mental life. 
One may then be tempted to compare these results with the Stroop effect. Although irrelevant, 
the color the word refers to interferes with the correct naming of the color of the ink. Shall we 
then conclude like Tversky and Hard (2009, p. 129) that in some circumstances, ―taking the 
other‘s perspective appears to be more natural and spontaneous than taking one‘s own‖?  
A few words of caution are necessary at this stage, as it is always the case if one wants to 
draw theoretical conclusions upon the basis of empirical results. First, it is worth noting that 
there are important differences among the studies described above. In particular, it is not clear 
that they all involve a mindreading component (e.g., Tversky and Hard, 2009). In addition, 
Böckler and coll. (2011) highlights the importance of joint attention, but it is questionable 
whether the other studies involve joint attention. Finally, one may want to distinguish 
between altercentric bias (adopting another‘s perspective when unnecessary) and altercentric 
error (adopting another‘s perspective when detrimental). When participants describe the 
relation between the book and the bottle, they display altercentric bias. When participants 
judge that they see only one disc rather than the two they can see from their own perspective, 
they make altercentric errors.  
One may also want to question to what extent the other‘s presence (whether it is a man in a 
photograph, a virtual avatar or a smurf) cannot appear as relevant in these studies. It is true 
that the task (such as counting the discs in the virtual room) does not require taking into 
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account the other‘s perspective. But subjects are aware that they participate in an experiment, 
in which in general each detail matters. Hence, third-person mindreading may be motivated 
by the experimental context. To what extent do the results described above can then be taken 
as evidence of the automaticity of mindreading? It is all the more difficult to answer this 
question that the notion of automaticity is often left undefined. More interesting may be the 
claim that 3
rd
 person mindreading is mandatory. Arguably, a process is mandatory if it is 
stimulus-driven (passive stimulation) and immune to interference. But the results so far do not 
suffice to show that 3
rd
 person mindreading is purely stimulus-driven, independent of the 
context.  
The Automaticity claim, however, is not at the core of our interest here. Rather, we are 
interested in the Altercentricity claim, and its implication for simulation-based accounts of 
mindreading. Even if the specific context of these studies can account for the apparently 
unnecessary 3
rd
 person mindreading, it cannot explain the fact that to some extent the other‘s 
perspective or belief seems to take over the participants‘ own perspective or belief. One may, 
however, regret the weakness of the altercentric effects in these studies. For instance, Samson 
and coll. reported an increase in error rate due to altercentric bias. Participants who thought 
that an avatar thought there were, say, two discs in a display when in fact there were three 
were more likely to make mistakes than if the avatar‘s attributed beliefs were correct. It is 
important to note, however, that the difference in error rate was only observed in two out of 
their three experiments. In these two experiments, participants had to shift their responses, 
answering sometimes from their own perspective and sometimes from that of the avatar. 
Given that the participants were facing a speed-accuracy tradeoff (participants had to react as 
quickly as possible), it is not very surprising that they would sometimes make mistakes, such 
as taking the avatar‘s perspective when they had not been asked to do so on a specific 
question. By contrast, in the third experiment, participants never had to take the avatar‘s 
perspective. They then stop making mistakes. Moreover, while reaction times still increased 
when the avatar‘s perspective was inconsistent with the participants‘ perspective, the increase 
was small, and so hardly behaviorally significant. Interestingly, in the smurf study, the 
reaction time did not increase when the smurf‘s belief was inconsistent with the participants‘s 
belief. Better-controlled experiments are thus needed to make the altercentric bias more 
salient. Nonetheless, these preliminary results invite us to consider in more detail the notion 
of altercentric bias, in particular within the simulationist framework. 
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3. Altercentric errors in simulation 
If egocentric errors cannot settle the debate between the Simulation theory and its rivals, 
then altercentric errors may work better. This time, however, the empirical evidence seems to 
run against Goldman‘s view. The fact that both egocentric bias and altercentric bias exist 
depending on the situation may indicate symmetry between 1
st
 person and 3
rd
 person, which is 
fully in line with Theory theories. Furthermore, altercentric errors seem to reflect a priority of 
3
rd
 person mindreading on 1
st
 person mindreading in some circumstances. How is it 
compatible with the Simulation theory? Since Goldman in his hybrid view acknowledge that 
we sometimes use theorizing rather than simulating in our understanding of other people, he 
can always reply that altercentric effects occur only in these specific cases when we do not 
attempt to take another‘s perspective. Nonetheless, this reply seems slightly unsatisfactory 
and hardly compatible with Goldman‘s overall emphasis on the first-person. We shall propose 
here another answer for proponents of the Simulation theory, which offers an account of 
altercentric effects within the simulationist framework itself. Furthermore, we shall argue that 
far from being incompatible with altercentric bias, simulation opens the door to such bias.  
It is first important to precisely understand what is at stake in altercentric errors. In 
particular, one should not assume that altercentric bias is the mere opposite of egocentric bias.  
They do not refer to one and the same phenomenon with a change of direction (from self to 
other in egocentric bias and from other to self in altercentric bias). Egocentric errors result 
from failure in 3
rd
 person mindreading. The subject mistakenly ascribes to the target her own 
mental state. In contrast, in altercentric errors, the subject does correctly understand the 
target‘s perspective or belief. Rather, the mistake consists (i) to some extent in mindreading 
the target when not required by the task, which may appear as an unnecessary cognitive cost, 
but more importantly (ii) in being unduly influenced by the target, especially when the target 
has a false belief (cf. the smurf‘s belief that the ball is there in Kovacs et al.). In other words, 
whereas egocentric bias reveals under-use of 3
rd
 person mindreading, altercentric bias reveals 
overuse of 3
rd
 person mindreading. If now we compare egocentric and altercentric errors 
within the simulationist framework, we can see that they correspond to different stages in the 
simulative process. To recap, the simulative process can be articulated into four steps:  
- Input selection: selection of the information both about the context and about the target 
that is relevant for the simulation.  
- Offline use of psychological processes:  emotional process, decision-making process, 
reasoning process and so forth are run off-line fed by the selected inputs. 
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- Output of psychological processes: the off-line use of psychological processes gives 
rise to emotions, intentions, beliefs and so forth. 
- Ascription of the output to the target: Emotions, intentions, beliefs and so forth are then 
attributed to the target.  
As previously argued, egocentric errors result from inappropriate input selection. Rather than 
pretending to have the target‘s beliefs and desires, one takes one‘s own beliefs and desires to 
feed the simulative process despite the fact that they are irrelevant. We will now argue that 
not only the 4-step model can account for altercentric errors, but it actually invites them. In 
particular, the third stage leaves open the possibility of confusing self and other.  
Goldman (2006, p. 186) raises two questions about the simulative process: who is the 
subject of the pretend states? And what are the tags associated with them? He replies: ―The 
mentalizer is the subject of those states (…) On the other hand, she can label, or tag, her 
pretend states as belonging to somebody else.‖ What is important here is the fact that at stage 
3, I am the subject of the output of the offline use of the relevant psychological process. For 
example, in the smurf study, when I put myself into the shoes of the smurf who sees the ball 
and then leaves, I myself entertain the (pretend) belief that the ball is behind the screen. 
Hence, I am the person who expects the ball to be there, even if I saw the ball rolling out of 
the screen. Altercentric errors can then be easily explained. There are actually two possible 
scenarios. First, the simulative process is disrupted. Arguably, we can conceive that the 
‗smurf tag‘ is left out for one reason or another (stage 4). That leaves open the possibility that 
I label the pretend belief as my own belief. It is then normal that this belief guides my 
behavior. However, the simulative process does not even need to be disturbed. Let us imagine 
now that the simulative process goes smoothly. My pretend belief is then associated with a 
smurf tag. But my pretend belief is erroneously taken as input to guide my behavior instead of 
my actual belief. Altercentric errors can thus result from errors either at the simulative level 
(wrong tag) or at the executive level (wrong input). In both scenarios, they reflect confusions 
between self and others: I take the smurf‘s beliefs as my own or I am acting on the basis of 
what the smurf believes rather than on what I myself believe. 
These two scenarios are all the more plausible that they can occur in other domains. Let us 
start with the failure of tagging scenario, which is well illustrated by the example of emotional 
contagion, by contrast to empathy (for further details, see Vignemont & Jacob, forthcoming). 
In empathy, I share your anxiety, but I am aware that I am in this emotional state because you 
are anxious. I can then ascribe anxiety to you. In emotional contagion, on the other hand, I 
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share your anxiety, but I am not aware that you are at the origin of my feeling anxious. 
Rather, I catch your emotion, so to speak, and appropriate it as my own. In the conceptual 
framework we just proposed, I fail to tag my state of anxiety as yours. One may even suggest 
that emotional contagion is just a specific type of altercentric error.
3
 Likewise, there are other 
instances of the executive scenario. For example, if you are a soldier, you may believe that it 
is a bad idea to attack during the night, but your officer believes it is the right thing to do. You 
then act on the basis of your officer‘s belief rather than your own. To some extent, obedience 
involves the same mechanisms as altercentric effects.
4
  
To conclude, altercentric bias is fully compatible with the Simulation theory. The first 
person is so much at the core of 3
rd
 person mindreading processes that one can actually forget 
that one is doing 3
rd
 person mindreading. While this removes one possible difficulty for the 
Simulation theory, this also brings a new threat. If the Simulation theory does indeed invite 
confusion between self and other, one may wonder if the Simulation theory is desirable from 
an evolutionary perspective. One may suggest that the evolution should have selected a 
mindreading process that prevents as much as possible interpersonal influence, including 
altercentric errors.  
 
4. Altercentric bias from an evolutionary perspective 
A long philosophical tradition, marked most notably by Reid (1764) and Hume (1748), has 
tried to answer the following question: do we—or can we—naturally trust what other people 
tell us? Recently, psychologists have started to weight in. For instance, Daniel Gilbert has 
purportedly shown that ―you can't not believe everything you read‖. People would first accept 
all communicated information before being able to question it in a second processing step 
(Gilbert et al., 1993). When the second processing cannot run its normal course, people may 
accept information that they would otherwise realize is false. While not identical, these 
findings and the altercentric bias share an interesting feature: information derived from 
someone else has an influence on us despite the availability of a negative assessment of that 
information. In this sense, both results suggest that considering information derived from 
                                                        
3
 Other examples may be found in the literature on action, and more particularly on the hypothesis of action 
mirroring (low-level simulation in Goldman‘s terms). Neuroscientific evidence indicates that some 
representations of action are recruited not only when we act, but also when we observe another agent acting. 
Furthermore, It has been argued that these motor representations shared between self and others can lead to 
confusion including self-attribution of other people‘s actions (for review, see Jeannerod, XXX)  
4 There are, however, differences. Obedience is – more or less – voluntary, whereas the allocentric effects we 
describe are not under voluntary control. Furthermore, there is a normativity in obedience that is absent in 
allocentric effects.  
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others as false and maintaining the separation with other beliefs deemed to be true are 
effortful tasks that can easily be derailed. These results thus support the view that trust 
towards information derived from others is a more natural stance than distrust. 
About ten years ago, Dan Sperber (2001) shone an evolutionary light on this debate 
(fittingly enough, in a special issue of Philosophical Topics dedicated to the work of Alvin 
Goldman). In an evolutionary perspective, it does not make much sense to be naturally or 
overly trusting. Individuals‘ interests very rarely overlap perfectly. As a result, even when 
they have an incentive to cooperate and communicate, some component of competition is 
retained. In the case of cooperation, it means that cooperators are often better off ―cheating:‖ 
reaping the fruits of cooperation while making the less effort possible. Cooperators have to be 
attuned to the existence of such cheaters if cooperation is to remain stable (Cosmides, 1989). 
Similarly speakers can influence listeners in ways that would only benefit the speakers and 
may be detrimental to the listeners—in other words, communication allows lying, cheating, 
manipulating. If communication is to remain stable, listeners have to be wary of misleading 
information communicated by speakers (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). 
To put it simply, individuals who could too easily be led to accept wrong beliefs—death caps 
are edible, lions like to be petted—would not have passed on their gullibility to many 
descendants. Accordingly, it should not be a surprise that Gilbert et al.‘s results—along with 
other instances of surreptitious influence such as subliminal persuasion—have been heavily 
criticized. Further experiments have shown that people can be lead to accept information they 
should reject only if participants have little previous knowledge on that topic and if the 
information is rather irrelevant (see, Mercier, in press-a).  
Prima facie, the altercentric bias also lends support to the view that people can be unduly 
influenced by others. However, in the experiments reviewed above, there is no 
communication. Instead, participants are influenced by what evolutionary biologist would call 
a cue: the individual being observed (e.g. the smurf) is not trying to influence the observer in 
any way; it is the observer who does all the work (see, Scott-Phillips, 2008). Through 
communicative or non-communicative behavior, individuals could lead others to think that 
they entertain false beliefs. These false beliefs would then have an impact on the behavior of 
the ‗victim‘ even if she knows they are false. The authors of the studies are aware of the 
dangers that can arise from altercentric bias: ―The finding that others‘ beliefs can be similarly 
accessible as our own beliefs might seem problematic for an individual, because it may make 
one‘s behavior susceptible to others‘ beliefs that do not reliably reflect the current state of 
affairs‖ (Kovács et al., 2010, p.1834).  
F. de Vignemont & H. Mercier (draft). Under influence. In Alvin Goldman and his Critics, edited by Hilary 
Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, Blackwell. 
The problem is that we have seen that simulative processes open the door to such 
interpersonal influence by allowing confusion between self and other either at the 
mindreading level or at the executive level. From an evolutionary perspective, this danger 
could be so great as to shed doubt on the validity of the Simulation theory. As far as we know, 
Goldman has never directly addressed this problem. However, proponents of the Simulation 
theory may want to reply that altercentric errors are not more of a problem than egocentric 
errors. To avoid being victims of egocentric errors, one must quarantine‘s one‘s own beliefs 
and desires. Similarly, it may be suggested that to avoid being victims of altercentric errors, 
one must quarantine one‘s own pretend beliefs and desires. If well quarantined, one‘s own 
pretend beliefs and desires should not contaminate other cognitive domains. They should have 
no effect on executive control or decision-making. Most probably, quarantine plays a major 
role in preventing altercentric errors, but does it suffice from an evolutionary perspective? It 
seems that egocentric errors are quite frequent, which in simulationist terms implies that 
failure to quarantine is frequent. One should then expect altercentric errors to be frequent as 
well. This runs against the hypothesis that ‗blind‘ trust is not advantageous from an 
evolutionary perspective. Interpersonal influence must be limited and under control. So we 
can ask: are we endowed with specific mechanisms designed to ward off manipulation 
attempts? Are they required to the same extent by communicative and non-communicative 
situations?  
Most studies of the dangers of interpersonal influence have focused on linguistic 
interactions. Sperber and his colleagues have suggested that humans are endowed with a suite 
of mechanisms designed to ward off the dangers—mentioned above—raised by 
communicated information (Sperber et al., 2010). They point out that people should exert 
epistemic vigilance when they deal with communicated information. Thus, people adjust their 
trust according to the perceived benevolence and competence of the speaker (Mascaro & 
Sperber, 2009), they tend to reject information that conflicts with their previous beliefs 
(Mercier, in press-b) and they evaluate arguments aimed at persuading them (Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011). By contrast, such vigilance is hardly necessary when it comes to our own 
perceptual or inferential mechanisms, which were designed for our better good and proved to 
be remarkably reliable.  
Given the preponderant role played by language in human interaction, the focus on 
linguistic communication is quite justified. Yet people can influence each other through other 
communicative means, even if they are not ostensive like language. In particular, the 
expression of emotion is a powerful mean of communication (ref?). Since most of the 
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information we derive from other people is acquired through communication, the dangers of 
being misinformed or manipulated through communication are also more important than 
those raised by non-communicative influence. Still, these dangers do exist. Such non-
communicative influence can be passive—as when the observer attributes a belief to the 
smurf simply because he is gazing in a given direction—or active—for instance, the smurf 
could have been intentionally gazing in that direction so that the observer attributes to him a 
given belief. If people are not careful about the information they infer from other people‘s 
non-communicative behavior, they can easily be misled. A simple example will be used to 
illustrate the differences and commonalities between the treatment of information derived 
from communicative and non-communicative behavior. In particular, it will show that 
communicative behavior is more likely to change people‘s mind than non-communicative 
behavior. 
 Imagine there is a game in the newspaper with a trick question and a reward for the 
people who send in the correct answer. Paul‘s roommate, Lara, has written down an answer 
on her copy of the newspaper, but Paul thinks that the answer is something else. Paul then 
faces several options:  
(i) He keeps believing that Lara believes that is the correct answer and either 
a. He changes his mind 
b. He believes she has made a mistake 
(ii) He changes his mind about what Lara actually believes and either 
a. Attributes to Lara the intention to mislead him: she does not actually believe 
that is the correct answer but wants him to believe it. 
b. Changes his interpretation of Lara‘s behavior (Lara never thought that that was 
the correct answer, for instance she was just writing a possible answer on her 
way to figuring out the definitive answer.) 
Now compare that situation with one in which Lara tells Paul: ―I think the answer is X.‖ 
Obviously, there are cases in which ostensive communication will be much more ambiguous 
than in the present example but overall the attributions that result from ostensive 
communication tend to be much less ambiguous than those resulting from the observation of 
non-communicative behaviors. Otherwise communication would be mostly moot. Option (iib) 
becomes much less likely in the case of communication, and the other interpretations are thus 
necessarily strengthened. There is no reason that (ib) or (iia) should be more likely in the case 
of communication than in the case of non-communicative behavior, and so Paul is more likely 
to change his mind when he has grounded his attribution in communicative behavior. This is 
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so not because he trusts Lara‘s competence or benevolence more, but simply because the 
interpretation is more ambiguous.  
In addition, communication gives listeners an extra reason to change their mind because of 
the benevolence of the communicator:  ―By the very act of making an assertion, the 
communicator indicates that she is committing herself to providing the addressee with 
genuine information, and she intends his recognition of this commitment to give him a motive 
for accepting a content that he would not otherwise have sufficient reasons to accept‖ 
(Sperber et al. 2010, p. 366).  
Let us imagine that Paul sees Lara carefully writing down her answer in the newspaper and 
leaving it on the table where he takes his breakfast, opened on the page of the game. Paul can 
now be quite sure that Lara wants him to believe that she believes that the answer is X. Still, 
Paul does not have the extra reason to accept X as the correct answer that he has when Lara 
tells him ―I think the answer is X.‖ For Lara‘s non-communicative behavior to provide as 
strong a reason as her communicative behavior to accept the intended belief, Lara should not 
be able to deny wanting to influence Paul, which should make her less likely to try to trick 
him. Furthermore, Paul must be aware of that, which provides him with a reason to accept 
Lara‘s belief. But how often does such a farfetched scenario (Paul has to know that Lara 
knows that he knows that she wants him to believe that she believes that the correct answer is 
X) happen? Other types of commitments can replace the intrinsic level of commitment found 
in communication. For instance, Lara could ask Paul to mail her answer to the newspaper 
(without saying what it is). If Paul looked up Lara‘s answer then, he would have a good 
reason to believe that it is actually what she believes to be the correct answer. The fact that 
extra proofs of commitment are necessary to make non-communicative behavior as credible 
or more credible than communicative behavior only demonstrates that communicative 
behavior is usually understood as naturally committing the speaker. Communication makes 
things much simpler (at least when it cannot be denied that communication took place at all, 
which is usually the case with verbal communication). 
 We have already seen two reasons why communicative behavior is more likely to 
influence other people than non-communicative behavior. A third reason could be an intrinsic 
suspicion of non-communicative metarepresentational intentions. When we think that 
someone intends us to think (or do) something, and yet the person does not rely on 
communication to achieve her end, we are entitled to doubt that her intentions are pure: 
otherwise, why would she not use the much more convenient way of transmitting information 
that is communication?  
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 To conclude, altercentric effects point to an interesting but understudied phenomenon: 
the possibility of influence through non-communicative behavior. We have tried to show here 
that the mechanisms of epistemic vigilance that are used to deal with communicated 
information can also be recruited to treat influence through non-communicative behavior. 
Even if the same mechanisms are used in both the communicative and non-communicative 
cases, the dynamics differ, making non-communicative behavior less likely to successfully 
influence people than communicative behavior. In addition, there is a further difference 
between undue interpersonal influence in communication and altercentric errors, as it is 
illustrated in the smurf study for example. The difference is not only between communicative 
and non-communicative effects. The difference is also between intentional and non-
intentional effects. Lara may be trying to influence Paul. But the smurf is not trying to 
influence the observer to his advantage. The subject is misled but the smurf is not responsible 
for it. If altercentric errors are merely the consequences of a failure to quarantine one‘s 
pretend states, then they can be seen as a rather innocuous computational bug, not more 
dangerous than when people make small mistakes in their understanding of the physical 
world. Furthermore, it is hard to see how individuals could come to make the best of the 
loophole in the quarantine process in order to exert undue influence on each other. Hence, it is 
true that the Simulation theory makes possible altercentric errors, which is not optimal from 
an evoluationary perspective, but it is not as bad as it could be because this cannot be used by 
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